Abstract. We prove that if Q is a nw-nep forcing then it cannot add a dominating real. We also show that amoeba forcing cannot be P(X)/I if I is an ℵ1-complete ideal. Furthermore, we generalize the results of [12] .
We show that those forcing notions, called nw-nep, cannot add dominating reals (Theorem 1.4). Then, by a similar proof, we show that a proper forcing notion which adds a dominating real and has sufficient amount of absoluteness for being predense, must force that b = ℵ 1 (see Theorem 1.6 ). This result applies to forcing notions like Amoeba for measure, the Hechler forcing and the Universal Meagre forcing (see Corollary 1.7), so in some sense it continues older work of Brendle, Judah and Shelah [3] and Brendle [2] . As a conclusion to 1.7 we get that a Boolean Algebra P(x)/J, where J is a ℵ 1 -complete ideal on x, cannot be isomorphic to the Boolean Algebra of the Amoeba forcing or the Universal Meagre forcing. This answers a question of Kamburelis (though this solution was obtained already in 1977 and discussed in [13, §4] ).
In the second section we try to extend the results of [12] to nep forcing.
There we showed that if a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion Q adds an unbounded real, then it adds a Cohen real. Here we weaken the demands on Q (it is just nep c.c.c.), but the Q-name for a Cohen real is constructed in V P , where P is a forcing notion adding a dominating real and preserving Q-candidates.
We refer the reader to [13, §4] and [14] for more background and references. This paper will be continued in [15] .
We would like to thank Jakob Kellner and Andrzej Ros lanowski for reading the paper extremely carefully resulting in considerable improvement of the presentation and readability.
Nwnep forcing notions
In [14] we introduced nep (non-elementary proper) forcing notions as the ones with reasonable definitions and such that the generic conditions exist over many countable models (not necessarily elementary submodels of H(χ)). Still, those models (called "candidates") were well-founded, see [14, §1] for details.
Here we consider a related property, allowing the candidates to be nonwell founded (so the new notion has a flavour of a stronger property). The definition below is ad-hoc to simplify the presentation. The "nw" stands for "non-well founded", of course. Definition 1.1. 1) We say that N is x − 1-nw-candidate if, fixing some strong limit χ, (a) or (b) holds where:
(a) N ≺ (H(χ), ∈) is countable, x ∈ N (b) for some N 1 as in (a), N is an elementary extension of N 1 not increasing ω N ; i.e., if N |= "g < ω" then g ∈ N 1 , and if N |= "y is a subset of H(ℵ 0 )" then y = {n ∈ N : N |= n ∈ y} (so really it should have one two-place relation E, E N is the membership relation in N ; but we shall write N |= "x ∈ y"). 2) We say that N is a standard x − 2-nw-candidate if (for χ as above) (a) holds or (b)' for some N 1 as in (a), N is a forcing extension of N 1 (and the demand in (b) on subsets of H(ℵ 0 ) holds).
3) Let Q ⊆ ω 2 or just Q ⊆ P(H(ℵ 0 )). We say that Q is a 1-nw-nep forcing notion if Q is a pair of formulasφ = (ϕ 0 (x), ϕ 1 (x, y)), in the language of set theory (with parameter r) such that (below we write Q-candidate instead of r − 1-nw-candidate):
(a) ϕ 0 (x) defines a set of reals (= set of members of Q) (b) ϕ 1 (x, y) defines a set of pairs of reals, a quasi order on {x :
1 -formulas; equivalently 1 , are upward absolute from Qcandidates, i.e., for Q-candidates
whenever N |= "I ⊆ Q is predense". 4) We say Q is 2-nw-nep-forcing if above we replace r − 1-nw-candidate by r − 2-candidates. 5) Let nw-nep mean 1-nw-nep.
The examples of nw-nep forcing notions include all ω ω-bounding forcing notions from [11] , that is the class K defined in [1, Definition 0.4]. So, in particular, the Silver forcing notion and the Sacks forcing notion are nwnep. In the realm of c.c.c. forcings, the natural examples of nw-nep are the Cohen forcing and the random real forcing. They both are nw-nep because they are very Souslin c.c.c., where: Definition 1.2. A forcing notion Q is very Souslin c.c.c. if it is Souslin c.c.c. and the relation " r n : n < ω is a maximal antichain in Q" Proof. Toward contradiction assume p * Q "η * ∈ ω ω is a dominating real".
Without loss of generality, p * "η * is strictly increasing, η * (n) > n". Let Γ 0 = {η ∈ ω> ω : η strictly increasing and η( ) > for < g(η)}; so p * Q "η * ∈ lim(Γ 0 )". As Q is nw-nep there is p * * such that ⊗ 1 p * ≤ Q p * * and for each n there is a countable J * n ⊆ Q which is an antichain predense above p * * , such that each p ∈ J * n forces a value to η * (n) and is above p * and above some p ∈ J * m for each m < n. [Why? Take a countable model N ≺ (H(χ), ∈) such that r, η * , p * ∈ N (so N is a Q-candidate). Inside N by induction on n < ω we choose J * n ∈ N as above except countability. Let p * * be above p * and be N, Q -generic.] Clearly above any p ≥ p * there are two incompatible elements of Q, so without loss of generality ⊗ 2 if m < n and p ∈ J * m then there are infinitely many members of J * n which are above p. Let Γ denote a subset of Γ 0 closed under initial segments such that ∈ Γ and η ∈ Γ ⇒ (∃ ∞ n)(η n ∈ Γ). We shall find Γ,k and choosep * such that:
is an enumeration of J * 0 and k m = 1. For n + 1, n ≥ 1, for each η ∈ n ω let m := m η = max Rang(η) and let p η,j : j < ω list the members of J * m which are above p η , so for some k η,j
Let η be the Q-name of the ω-branch of Γ such that p * * Q "p η n ∈ G Q " for each n < ω. We claim that: if h : Γ −→ ω, then p * * Q "for every large enough n < ω we have η (n) > h(η n)".
[Why? Let f h : ω −→ ω be f h (n) = sup{h(η) : η ∈ Γ and sup Range(η) ≤ n} + 1.
Note that the supremum is over a finite set as every η ∈ Γ is strictly
, and we shall find n as required. Clearly for some n * > 2 we
So assume m ∈ [n * , ω), then:
For an ordinal α < ω 1 , let Ξ α = {ρ :ρ = ρ δ : δ ≤ α where δ is limit and each ρ δ is a (strictly) increasing ω-sequence converging to δ}. Forρ ∈ Ξ α , we define a function gρ from Γ to α + 1, defining gρ(η) by induction on lg(η) as follows:
A n,ρ is a front of Γ, and it is above A m,ρ for m < n. Hence for each m we have
Now there is a Q-candidate N , with (ω 1 ) N not well ordered, and 
Choose α * n for n < ω such that N |= "α * n+1 < α * n are countable ordinals". Without loss of generality N |= "α * n is a limit ordinal", and so for someρ we have N |= "ρ ∈ Ξ α * 0 ". So clearly N |= "I n,ρ is predense above p * * " for each n. By 1.1(3)(d), there is r * ∈ Q above p * * which is N, Q -generic.
By (as p * ≤ Q r * ) there are q and 0 < ω such that r * ≤ Q q and q Q "for
. So for some 1 , q forces that
Hence 2 q Q "the number of n such that (∃ )(η ∈ A N n,ρ ) is finite". But 1 + 2 gives a contradiction.
1.4
Definition 1.5. Let Q be a forcing notion, I, J ⊆ Q. We say that "I is predense above J " whenever ( * ) if p ∈ Q is above every q ∈ J then p is compatible with some r ∈ I. 
Proof. It is enough to prove that some condition above p * forces b = ℵ 1 .
By the properness of Q (or just assumption (a)) without loss of generality there are p * * and J * n : n < ω as in the beginning of 1.4. Let η * , Γ,p * = p * η : η ∈ Γ , η , Ξ α for α < ω 1 and gρ, hρ forρ ∈ Ξ α , α < ω 1 be as in the proof of 1.4. For limit δ < ω 1 chooseρ δ ∈ Ξ δ so thatρ δ 0 =ρ δ 1 (δ 0 + 1) whenever δ 0 < δ 1 < ω 1 are limit. We are going to show that
what will complete the proof. So assume not, hence for some h * and q * , we have p * * ≤ Q q * and
Without loss of generality h * is a hc (hereditarily countable) Q-name above q * , more specifically, for each n < ω we have an antichain r * n, : < ω of Q predense over q * and such that r * n, 
Q "h * (n) = k n, " and recalling that every η ∈ Γ is strictly increasing and the definition of hρ in N , clearly
But by the clause (d) of the assumption this amount of predensity is upward absolute (from N to V) hence
But q * ≤ Q r * and {r * n, : < ω} is predense (in Q) above q * , hence ( * ) 4 n for each n < ω in V the set Proof. We will apply 1.6. The amoeba forcing Q is {T ⊆ ω> 2 : T is non empty closed under initial segments and Leb(lim(T )) > 1/2}, ordered by inverse inclusion; note that for notational simplicity we allow trees with maximal nodes.
Clearly "p ∈ Q","p ≤ Q q" are Borel relations and any p, q ∈ Q has a l.u.b.: p ∩ q and "p, q are compatible" is Borel. The main point is to show that "{p : < n} is predense above {q 1 , q 2 }" is upward absolute for nwcandidates; we can replace {q 1 , q 2 } by {q} where q = q 1 ∩ q 2 . Suppose that 0 < m, k < ω and for s ⊆ q 1 ∩ q 2 ∩ m 2 define:
this is a real number ∈ [0, 1], and we let
We shall show that the following statements are equivalent:
(α) there is r ∈ Q above q incompatible with p 0 , . . . , p n−1 (β) for some r ∈ Q we have Leb(lim(p ∩ r)) ≤
If (α) holds, let r exemplify it, so for some ε 1 > 0, Leb(lim(r)) > 1/2 + ε 1 , and Leb(lim(p ∩ r)) ≤ 1/2 for < n. We can find, for < n, a clopen
Let r = {η ∈ r: there is ρ ∈ ω 2\ B above η}, and k be large enough, they exemplify (β). 
So r ∈ Q, also for < n, the conditions r, p are incompatible as Leb(
So we have finished proving (γ) ⇒ (α) hence proving (α) ⇔ (β) ⇔ (γ).
1.7

Conclusion 1.8. 1) There is no ℵ 1 -complete ideal J on a set X such that the Boolean algebra P(X)/J isomorphic to the Boolean algebra of the Amoeba forcing (or any other c.c.c. forcing satisfying the assumption of 1.6). 2) The following is impossible (a) J is a (< κ)-complete ideal on a set X, and (b) P(X)/J is isomorhpic to the Boolean algebra of the forcing notion Q which satisfies the κ + -c.c., (c) forcing with Q adds a dominating real, and (d) forcing with Q makes b ≤ κ (κ as an ordinal).
Proof. 1) Follows by part (2) for κ = ℵ 1 below and Corollary 1.7.
2) The proof is close to [4, 3.1] and [5] , but we give a self contained proof.
Let κ 1 be maximal such that J is (< κ 1 )-complete, so J is not (< κ 
in which there is a η ∈ ω ω dominating ( ω ω) V hencef , a contradiction. 1.8 Remark 1.9. 1) Suppose that κ is a measurable cardinal and force with FS iteration of the Hecher forcing notions, κ in length, and then consider
The aim of the series of papers [4] , [5] , [6] is to show that the general situation is similar to this.
2) The original aim of 1.6 was to deal with c.c.c. simply defined forcing notions. For this the demands on Q in 1.6 seem to be reasonable.
Around "adding a Cohen real"
In [12] we have proved that if a Souslin-c.c.c. forcing notion Q adds an unbounded real, then it adds a Cohen real. Here, we try to extend the result to nep forcing. The proof here does not rely on [12] (and the results imply the results there).
More fully we use the following: let N be a countable elementary submodel of (H(χ), ∈) to which P, Q belongs, G a subset of P N generic over N then N [G] is a Q-candidate. It may be clearer to let M be the ordi-
Definition 2.1. 1) Let K be a class of countable submodels of (H(χ), ∈), all of a large part of ZFC, and let Q be a forcing notion with set of elements ⊆ ω 2. We say that Q if K-nep if for some pairφ = (ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 ) of Σ 1 1 -formulas with a parameter r ∈ ω 2 we have (a) the set of elements of Q and ≤ Q are defined by ϕ 0 (x), ϕ 1 (x, y), (b) if N ∈ K,φ ∈ N and p ∈ Q N then for some q ∈ Q we have (α) Q |= p ≤ q, (β) q is (N, Q)-generic, which means that for every I * ∈ pd(N, Q) = {I ∈ N : N |= "I is predense in Q"}, the set {r : N |= "r ∈ I * "} is predense in Q above q and q "G ∩ Q N is ≤ Q N -directed". 2) Let P be a proper forcing notion. We define the class K P as the collection of all countable models N such that
Proposition 2.2. 1) Assume (a) P is a proper forcing notion, Q is a K P -nep-forcing which is c.c.c., and
is not dominated by any old f ∈ ω ω", and
Then in V P 1 forcing with Q adds a Cohen real.
2) Assume that we replace clause (b) above by
is not equal to any old member of ω 2". Then, in V P , 2 there is a strictly increasing sequence n i : i < ω such that for every q * ∈ Q for all i < ω large enough: 2 i ≤ |{η ∈ n i 2: some q above q * forces that η = η n i }|.
Proof. Of course, it is enough to prove that for a dense set of q ∈ Q, the result holds above q. For part (1) let t be 1, f t = f and for part (2) let t = 2 and f t = η. So f t is actually (r * n, , k n, : n < ω, < ω where r * n, "f t (n) = k n, " and, for each n < ω, r * n, : < ω is a maximal antichain of Q; similarly for the P-name g as we can replace P by P ≥p and P is proper. Without loss of generality f 1 , g are (forced to be) strictly increasing; note that for f 1 this just means that
so it is absolute enough. Suppose q * ∈ Q. Let (χ be strong limit and) N ≺ (H(χ), ∈) be a countable model such that {P, g, q * , Q} ∈ N and f t ∈ N , i.e., (r * n, , k n, ) : n < ω, < ω belongs to N . Now obviously ( * ) 1 N |= "P is a forcing notion, g is a P-name of an increasing member of ω ω dominating all old ones".
Observe:
( * ) 2 if M ∈ K P ,r = r : < ω is a maximal antichain of Q andr ∈ M, r ∈ Q M , then M |= "r is a maximal antichain of Q". [Why? First, if n < m < ω, M |= "r n , r m are compatible in Q" let r ∈ Q M be a common upper bound by ≤ M Q , it is a common upper bound in Q, contradiction. Second, if M |= "q ∈ Q is incompatible with each r ", let
Continuing ( * ) 1 , for t = 1: ( * ) 3 N |= "forcing with P preserves the property of (Q, f t ), i.e., f t not dominated".
[Why? First being a Q-name of a member of ω ω is preserved after forcing with P by ( * ) 2 + assumption (d): consider a generic G ⊆ P N , G ∈ V over N and let 3 M = N [G] -it belongs to K P and we can apply ( * ) 2 . Second, assume toward contradiction that ( * ) 3 fails. Let p * ∈ P N force the negation (in N ) and choose, in V, a set G ⊆ P N generic over N to which p * belongs
As the conclusion of ( * ) 3 fails we can find
[Why? As N ≺ (H(χ), ∈).] Without loss of generality
[Why? As, e.g., we can replace g by ν , where ν (0) = g(0) and ν (n + 1) = g(ν (n) + 1), note that ν is strictly increasing as g is.]
Let the Q-name η 1 ∈ ω 2 be such that for every < ω we have η 1 ( ) = 1 ⇔ ∈ Rang(f 1 ) and let η 2 = η.
[Why? For t = 1 by ( * ) 3 , for t = 2 even easier immitating the proofs of ( * ) 3 and ( * ) 4 (a) for some n * < ω: for every m ∈ (n * , ω) we have
[Why? By ( * ) 4 and ( * ) 3 .] Consequently, ( * ) 9 t = 1: q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q are incompatible if for no n * < ω and η ∈
finitely many members.
We say that u ∈ [ω] ℵ 0 is large for (q, η t ) if for every r ∈ Q above q the following holds:
r,u Case t = 1: For some n * ∈ u, for every n, m ∈ u such that n * < n < m, for some ν
Case t = 2: For some n * ∈ u if n, m ∈ u and n * ≤ n < m then for some
It will take us awhile. Let ũ = Rang(g * ), it is a P-name in N , and assume that ũ is not as required, so for some p * ∈ P N and P-names q, n we have N |="p * P [q ∈ Q is above q * and ¬⊗ q,ũ ]". Let G(∈ V) be a subset of P N generic over N and such that p * ∈ G.
, we choose inductively a sequence (k i , n i , m i ) : i < ω so that:
and for each i < ω, there are no
Note that, in both cases, the choice is possible by our assumption on p * (and by p  *  ∈ G) .
Without loss of generality p * ∈ P is such that it forces all the above. So ( * ) 10 (a) if t = 1 then
Let I n : n < ω list the dense open subsets of P which belong to N . Let
Let us carry out the induction.
In step k = 0 let p <> = p * , n <> is chosen as below, m <> is immaterial. If we have definedp k , first choose m ρ k < > to satisfy clause (f), then choose p ρ k < > ≥ p ρ k to satisfy clause (e) (possible by clause (c)) and choose p ρ k < > ≥ p ρ k < > to satisfy clause (d). Lastly, choose n ρ k < > to satisfy clause (c); this is possible by Oservation 2.3 below.
It is easy to see the following.
1 Assume that ν 1 = ν 2 ∈ ω 2 and ν 1 
[Why? Clause (α) follows from clauses (b) + (f) of~0. Clause (β) follows from clause (α) and ( * ) 10 
(b).] Hencẽ
But by the definition of q, q witnesses that h(n) ≥ m, a contradiction.
Observation
Continuation of the proof of 2.2: The conclusion of the subclaim holds in V as N ≺ (H(χ), ∈), and this gives the conclusion of part (2) of 2.2 when t = 2, and the conclusion of part (1) of 2.2 when t = 1; the proof is similar to [12, 1.12, p . 168] but we give details. By the subclaim, as N ≺ (H(χ), ∈) , clearly in V P we have: for every q * ∈ Q some infinite u ⊆ w is large for (q * , η t ). Fix such q * , u. We concentrate on t = 1 as the case t = 2 is obvious by this point.
Let u\{0} = {n i : 1 ≤ i < ω} be such that n 0 =: 0 < n 1 < n 2 < . . . , let k(i, Clearly for every p ∈ Q and n < ω we have p 1 "η t (k) = 0 for every k ≥ n". Hence Q "{k < ω : η t (k) = 1} is infinite", hence Q "ρ ∈ ω 2". It is enough to prove that q * Q "ρ is a Cohen real over V P ". So let T ∈ V P be a given subtree of ω> 2 which is nowhere dense, i.e., (∀η ∈ T )(∃ν)[η ν ∈
ω> 2\T ], and we should prove q * Q "ρ / ∈ lim(T )". So assume q * ≤ q ∈ Q and we shall find q , q ≤ q ∈ Q such that q Q "ρ / ∈ lim(T )", this suffices. We apply the choice of u so for some n * ∈ u, if n, m ∈ u, n * < m < n then for some ν ∈ n 2 ∩ T q [η t ] we have ∈ (n * , m) ⇒ ν( ) = 0 but (∃ )(m ≤ < n & η * ( ) = 1]. As n * ∈ u for some i( * ) we have n * = n i( * ) and Ξ =: {ρ m : m < n * } is finite hence Ξ =: {ρ * k 0 . . . ρ * k 1 : k 0 < . . . < k < n * } is finite. As T is nowhere dense we can find a sequence ρ * ∈ ω> 2 such that: ρ ∈ Ξ ⇒ ρ ρ * / ∈ T and choose i > i( * ) such that ρ * ρ * n i . This is possible by the definition of ρ * n i , i.e., it is enough that i > 2 g(ρ * ) and i = Σ{ρ * ( )2 : < g(ρ * )} mod 2 g(ρ * ) .
As said above we can find q ≥ q such that q "if n * ≤ < n i then η t ( ) = 0 but for some ∈ [n i , n i+1 ) we have η t ( ) = 1". So q forces that ρ n i appears in the choice of ρ and before it we have a concatenation of finite sequences which belong to Ξ , so we are done.
2.2
